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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH B. SCHULTZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 20010908 - CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (2) (e). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, 
AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES. 
ISSUE 1: Is the order of restitution signed by the Board of Pardons a month 
after Schultz's sentence was terminated valid? 
Standard of Review: The district court's factual findings are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous standard." Its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 21 P.3d 245, 2001 UT 55. 
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Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and accompanying memorandum. R.49-79, 107-119. 
ISSUE 2: Does the subsequent docketing of that order by the district court 
create an enforceable judgment against Schultz? 
Standard of Review: The district court's factual findings are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous standard." Its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 21 P.3d 245, 2001 UT 55. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and accompanying memorandum. R. 49-79, 107-119. 
ISSUE 3: Did the Board satisfy the requirements of §76-3-201 and §77-27-5 
U.C.A.? 
Standard of Review: The district court's factual findings are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous standard." Its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 21 P.3d 245, 2001 UT 55. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and accompanying memorandum. R. 49-79, 107-119. 
ISSUE 4: May the court issue a writ of garnishment in the name of the victim to 
enforce that judgment? 
2 
Standard of Review: The district court's factual findings are reviewed under 
the "clearly erroneous standard." Its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Hatch v. Boulder Town Council 21 P.3d 245, 2001 UT 55. 
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and accompanying memorandum. R. 49-79, 107-119. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated §76-3-201 
Utah Code Annotated §77-27-5 
Utah Code Annotated §77-27-6 (4) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Schultz's criminal sentence was terminated by the Board of Pardons (Board) 
effective August 4, 1997; thereafter, on September 8, 1997, the Board entered an order 
assessing Schultz $3,798.43 as restitution for Holly O. Everton, Schultz's ex-wife. The 
order was forwarded to the district court pursuant to §77-27-6 (4) U.C.A. to constitute a 
lien against Schultz when entered on the court's docket. On September 15, 1997, Judge 
Taylor signed the order. The order of restitution was not delivered to Schultz and Schultz 
was unaware of the entry of the order by Judge Taylor. In March, 2001, the Second 
District Court issued a Writ of Continuing Garnishment (Wage) in the name of Holly 
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Everton, Plaintiff v. Joseph B. Schultz, Defendant, which was served upon Schultz's 
employer. Upon learning of the civil judgment, Schultz moved to set it aside and to 
quash the writ of garnishment, which motion Judge Taylor denied. Schultz appeals from 
that decision; therefore, this appeal relates to a civil judgment entered within the context 
of a criminal proceeding some 17 years after Schultz's criminal conviction. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was found guilty but mentally ill of attempted criminal homicide and 
aggravated assault and sentenced to the Utah State Prison on October 17, 1983 for 1-15 
years. 
The trial court did not order Schultz to pay restitution. (Addendum A) 
On April 28, 1989, Schultz was granted a parole from the Utah State Prison, 
effective October 26, 1993. No restitution was ordered. (Addendum B) 
On September 23, 1993, at a special attention review, the Board amended 
Schultz's parol agreement to include MCCC until stable." A condition of parole was 
added that Schultz "Pay restitution of TBD.n (Addendum C) 
On November 30, 1993, Schultz signed an amended parole agreement which 
required him to "Pay restitution of $TBD CASE #." (Addendum D) 
On September 3, 1996, the Board granted Schultz a statutory termination 
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of his sentence and parole effective October 25, 1996. The Board did not order 
restitution. (Addendum E) 
On October 23, 1996, two days before Schultz's sentence was to terminate, the 
Board held a parole violation hearing contending that he had failed to pay restitution 
although no restitution amount had ever been established by the Board. 
At the hearing, the Board ordered that a warrant be issued to toll Schultz's 
supervision date of October 24, 1996. Mr. Schultz was placed under arrest and then 
released on his own recognizance pending a parole violation hearing before the Board. 
This was characterized by the Board as a "Final decision of the hearing." (Addendum F) 
The October 23, 1996 restitution hearing was conducted by Lewis Escobar, 
hearing officer. At the hearing, Schultz challenged the authority of the Board to order 
restitution and specifically cited the statutory requirements of §§76-3-201 and 77-27-5 
U.C.A. in the event that restitution was ordered. At the conclusion of the hearing, Mr. 
Escobar took the matter under advisement. The victim did not appear at the restitution 
hearing. (Addendum G) 
On October 25, 1996, Schultz was notified that the Board had decided to 
have a full hearing at a later date on the matter of restitution. (Addendum H). 
On April 22, 1997, Pete Hahn, for the Board, held a special attention hearing on 
the issue of restitution. The victim again did not appear and no findings were made. Mr. 
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Hahn took the matter under advisement. Schultz heard nothing further from the Board 
until August, 1997. On August 5, 1997, the Board at a special attention hearing 
terminated Schultz's sentence effective August 4, 1997. In addition, the Board decided to 
forward a request for restitution of $3,798.43 to the sentencing court for a civil judgment 
as the final decision of the hearing held on April 22, 1997. (Addendum I). The 
Department of Corrections mailed Schultz a copy of the Board's action on August 15, 
1997. (Addendum J) 
On September 8, 1997, over a month after Schultz's sentence had been 
terminated, Michael R. Sibbett, on behalf of the Board, signed an Order of Restitution and 
forwarded it to the district court pursuant to §77-27-6 (4) U.C.A. to be entered on the 
court's docket (R.2). On September 17, 1997, Judge Taylor signed the restitution order. 
No notice of the restitution order was provided to Schultz and Schultz had no knowledge 
that the order had been docketed by Judge Taylor. According to the mailing certificate, 
the address of Defendant was "unknown" to the Board at the time the Order of Restitution 
was entered (Addendum K), although the Department of Corrections had communicated 
with Schultz three weeks previously. (Addendum J) 
In March, 2001, the Second District Court issued a Writ of Continuing 
Garnishment (Wage) in the name of Holly Everton, Plaintiff v. Joseph Schultz B. Schultz 
Defendant. (Addendum L). The writ of garnishment was served upon Schultz's 
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employer. At that time, Schultz became aware of the existence of the purported judgment 
against him. 
Schultz immediately contested the validity of the writ and moved to set aside the 
judgment. Even though the victim filed a response to Schultz's motion (R. 80), Judge 
Taylor privately determined that a contest between Schultz's attorney and a pro se victim 
was "uneven"; accordingly, he referred the matter to the Attorney General along with 
copies of the materials. The court, however, did not notify Schultz's counsel of the 
referral to the Attorney General. Approximately two months later the Attorney General 
filed a motion to intervene on behalf of the Board. 
On November 1, 2001, Judge Taylor issued a Memorandum Decision denying 
Schultz's motion and releasing the stay of enforcement of the writ of garnishment that he 
had previously entered. (Addendum M) 
This appeal is from the ruling of Judge Taylor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
The jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons over Schultz ended when his 
sentence was terminated. As a result, the Order of Restitution, signed by the Board a 
month after the sentence of Schultz was terminated, is void. 
7 
Point II 
The docketing by the district court of an invalid order from the Board of Pardons 
cannot create a valid judgment against Schultz. 
Point HI 
The Board of Pardons made no findings and failed to meet the statutory 
requirements of §76-3-201 and §77-27-5 U.C.A. 
Point IV 
The victim has no standing to bring a writ of garnishment to enforce a 
judgment entered by the district court pursuant to an order of restitution by the Board of 
Pardons. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE BOARD OF PARDONS LOST JURISDICTION OVER SCHULTZ WHEN 
HIS SENTENCE WAS TERMINATED; THEREFORE, ITS ORDER ENTERED A 
MONTH LATER, IS VOID 
Section 77-27-5, U.C.A. grants the Board the authority, among other things, to 
terminate sentences. Although Schultz has not found any case law specifically on point, 
it follows that once the Board has exercised its authority to terminate a sentence, it no 
longer has jurisdiction over that individual; therefore, it must also follow that any 
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purported order executed by the Board after sentence, and thus jurisdiction, has been 
terminated, is void. 
In State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41,421 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the long established rule in this State that an order does not become effective 
until it is actually signed by the court. Such a rule would seem equally applicable to the 
Board of Pardons. 
In this case, Schultz's sentence was terminated by the Board effective August 4, 
1997. After that date, it had no power over him. As a result, its purported order of 
restitution signed on September 8, 1997, over a month after it had terminated the sentence 
of Schultz, is void. 
POINT II 
SINCE THE RESTITUTION ORDER OF SEPTEMBER 8,1997 IS VOID, THE 
PURPORTED JUDGMENT BY THE DISTRICT COURT ON SEPTEMBER 17, 
1997 IS ALSO VOID 
There is a long line of cases in Utah holding that once a prisoner is incarcerated 
in the Utah State Prison, the exclusive jurisdiction of that case passes to the Board of 
Pardons. See, e.g. State v. Bakalov, 979 P.2d 799, 1999 UT 45 (under indeterminate 
sentencing scheme judge has no discretion in fixing term of imprisonment, it is left to the 
unfettered discretion of the Board of Pardons); Rawlings v. Holden, 809 P.2d 958 (UT 
1994) (Board of Pardons, not district court, has authority to determine actual time 
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served); State v. Alvillar, 748 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1988) (once a defendant has been 
convicted and incarcerated, jurisdiction passes exclusively to the Board of Pardons.) State 
v. Schreuder, 111 P.2d 264 (UT 1985) (upon sentence Jurisdiction passes to Board of 
Pardons and if defendant has a claim that was not addressed to the trial court at the time 
of sentencing, that request must thereafter be directed to the Board of Pardons); Combs v. 
Turner, 25 Utah 2d 397, 483 P.2d 473 (1971), (district court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss 
the case after defendant was sentenced to prison); In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P.531 
(1903) (exercise of pardoning power belongs exclusively to Board of Pardons); See also, 
Graham v. Thompson, 246 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1957) (Board of Pardons has exclusive 
power to commute sentences). Thus, the district court could not independently order 
restitution after Schultz was sentenced. The sole basis for a civil restitution judgment in 
this case arises from the Board's September 8th order. On September 17th the district 
court merely adopted the Board's order by signing it ("IT IS SO ORDERED"). 
If the order of the Board of Pardons is invalid, it must necessarily follow that 
any purported judgment entered by the district court with respect to that invalid order is 
also invalid. 
POINT III 
THE BOARD FAILED TO FOLLOW THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION. 
In Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017 (UT 1996), the Supreme Court stated, 
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We agree that the language of section 77-27-5 mandates that the Board 
must follow both the substantive standards of section 76-3-201 and its 
procedural requirements. It must not only consider the four statutory 
factors when it orders restitution as a condition of parole, but it must also 
comply with the same procedural requirements imposed on a trial court, 
e.g., it shall make a record of the reasons for its decision. 
Section 76-3-201, U.C.A. requires that the trial court consider certain factors and 
determine whether to order complete, partial, or nominal restitution. These factors are: 
1. The financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose; 
2. The ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis 
or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
3. The rehabilitative affect on the defendant of the payment of restitution; 
and 
4. Other circumstances which the court determines make restitution 
inappropriate. 
The Board made no findings concerning its reasons for restitution as required by 
§76-3-201 (4) (d); indeed, the Board made no findings of any kind and clearly did not 
comply with the requirements of §76-3-201. In addition, it did not enter a restitution 
order during the time it had jurisdiction over Mr. Schultz. The district court also failed to 
make the required findings and apparently failed to even consider the requirements of 
§76-3-201 when it blindly signed the invalid restitution order that had been forwarded to 
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it by the Board. In this case, Mr. Schultz received no notice that the district court had 
entered a civil judgment against him or that it was even contemplating doing so; 
therefore, Mr. Schultz had no opportunity to invoke the requirements of §76-3-201, to 
contest the entry of the civil judgment, or to object to the failure of both the court and the 
Board to follow the statutory requirements for the imposition of restitution. 
POINT IV 
THE VICTIM MAY NOT ENFORCE A RESTITUTION ORDER OF THE 
BOARD OF PARDONS 
The trial court could have ordered restitution at the time Schultz was sentenced 
but it did not. Under §77-18-6 (b) (iv) U.C.A., a "judgment of conviction" that orders the 
payment of restitution may be collected by the victim; however, since the trial court did 
not order restitution at the time of sentencing, there was no such judgment in this case. 
In this case the Ms. Everton filed a writ of garnishment, in her own name as 
plaintiff, attempting to attach Schultz's wages. There is no statutory authority for her to 
do so. The statute only provides for the Board to forward a restitution order to the 
sentencing court to be entered on the judgment docket for "civil collection remedies." 
Even if the order were valid, there is no authority for the Ms. Everton to substitute herself 
as the plaintiff in this case in order to collect the restitution order of the Board. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of Judge Taylor must be revised. 
DATED this &Cr day of February, 2002. 
J. Thomas Bowen 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this day of February 2002,1 caused to be mailed, 
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Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment to Utah State Hospital and Prison 
EXHIBIT A 
* ' " & > 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs 
JOSEPH B. SCHULTZ, 
Defendant, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND J 
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE ^ 
HOSPITAL AND PRISON ^ ? ^ 
No. 15274 ,<t 
COUNT I . The d e f e n d a n t h a v i n g been found GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 
by a j u r y , of the o f f e n s e o f ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, At tempted 
M u r d e r i n the Second D e g r e e , a g a i n s t HOLLY SCHULTZ, being now p resen t 
i n c o u r t and ready f o r s e n t e n c e , i s now a d j u d i c a t e d GUILTY BUT MENTAL-
LY I L L o f the above o f f e n s e and i s now sentenced t o NOT LESS THAN ONE 
( 1 ) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
COUNT I I . The d e f e n d a n t h a v i n g been found GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 
by a j u r y , of the o f f e n s e o f ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, At tempted 
Murder i n the Second D e g r e e , a g a i n s t DAVID McDONALD, being now p r e s e n t 
i n c o u r t and ready f o r s e n t e n c e , i s now a d j u d i c a t e d GUILTY BUT MENTAL-
"~TLT^p-f-—the above o f f ens_e_ a.nd_.i s now s e n t e n c e d t o NOT LESS THAN ONE 
( 1 ) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN ( 1 5 ; T Y E A R S AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
r -Qt rm—TIT: TTTe~areTn&TnfaTrt---^^ GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 
by a j u r y , o f the o f f e n s e o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Th i rd Degree 
F e l o n y , be ing now p r e s e n t i n c o u r t and ready f o r sentence, is now 
a d j u d i c a t e d GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL o f the above o f fense and i s now 
s e n t e n c e d t o NOT TO EXCEED FIVE (5) YEARS AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON. 
A l l t h r e e (3 ) coun t s runn ing c o n c u r r e n t l y . 
The de fendan t i s remanded i n t o cus tody o f the S h e r i f f o f 
t h i s c o u n t y , f o r d e l i v e r y t o t h e U t a h S t a t e H o s p i t a l , P rovo , U t a h , 
f o r a p e r i o d not t o exceed SIX (6) MONTHS w i t h o u t b e n e f i t of a rev iew 
h e a r i n g as p r o v i d e d by 7 7 - 3 5 - 2 1 . 5 ( 5 ) . Upon d i s c h a r g e from the S ta te 
H o s p i t a l the de fendan t i s t o be t r a n s f e r r e d t o the Utah State P r i son 
t o s e r v e the ba lance o f h i s s e n t e n c e . ,, 
Dated t h i s 17 th day o f O c t o > e r i 1 9 R 3 . •  ' / / 
ADDENDUM B 
Order of Parole 
EXHIBIT B 
MEMBERS 
HL W B0YDEN _ 
OHLA J. PALAOOS ^h^AV p*t>l W SHEFFIELD 
RY L WEBSTER \S-^S AdmKHt^tof 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER OF PAROLE 
UTAH STATE OBSCIS NO. 00012599 
UTAH STATE PRISON NO. 17875 
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF SCHULTZ* JOSEPH B 
T h i s m a t t e r of a p p l i c a t i o n f o r p a r o l e , t e r m i n a t i o n of s e n t e n c e , or 
e x p i r a t i o n of s e n t e n c e h a v i n g come before t h e Utah S t a t e Board of Pardons 
i n a r e g u l a r l y s c h e d u l e d h e a r i n g on the 28th day of A p r i l , 1989, and the 
a p p l i c a n t a p p e a r i n g i n p e r s o n or having waived m w r i c i n e the r i g h t to 
a p p e a r a n c e a n d t h e Boa rd hav ing heard the c a s e , i s s u e s t h e fo l lowing o r d e r : 
I t i s h e r e b y o r d e r e d t h a t SCHULTZ, JOSEPH B be p a r o l e d from the 
p u n i s h m e n t a n d s e n t e n c e h e r e t o f o r e imposed upon h i m / h e r by a judge of the 
Second D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n and f o r t he County of Weber f o r t h e c r i rae(s ) of 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, 2nd d e g r e e f e l o n y , E x p i r a t i o n 1 0 / 1 6 / 9 8 ; CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, 
2nd d e g r e e f e l o n y . E x p i r a t i o n 1 0 / 1 6 / 9 8 ; AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 3rd degree f e l o n y , 
E x p i r a t i o n 1 0 / 1 6 / 8 8 -
The p a r o l e s h a l l n o t become e f f e c t i v e u n t i l 2 6 t h day of October , 1993, 
The a p p l i c a n t a g r e e s t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p a r o l e and e v i d e n c e s h i s agreement by 
s i g n i n g t h e p a r o l e a g r e e m e n t . The pa ro l e a g r e e m e n t o r c o n t r a c t s h a l l be 
a d m i n i s t e r e d by d u l y a u t h o r i z e d a g e n t s of the Utah S t a t e Department of 
C o r r e c t i o n s f o r t h e U t a h S t a t e Board of P a r d o n s . 
I t i s f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h a t i f and in t he e v e n t t h e above named a p p l i c a n t 
s h a l l b e g u i l t y of any i n f r a c t i o n s of the r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s of the Utah 
S t a t e P r i s o n or s h a l l f a i l or refuse to perform d u t i e s as assigned by the Utah 
S t a t e P r i s o n o r i s found to be in viola t ion of any o ther law of the State of 
Utah p r i o r to the e f f e c t i v e date of said p a r o l e , then t h i s Order of Parole i s 
revoked and becomes n u l l and void^ 
Dated t h i s 28th day of A p r i l , 1989. 
By Order of the Board of Pardons of the S t a t e of Utah, I have this 
1 s t day of May, 1989, reduced i t s decision in t h i s mat ter to wri t ing and 
he reby a f f i x my s i g n a t u r e as Administrator for and on behalf of the State ot 
Utah , Board of P a r u o n s . 
ADDENDUM C 
Special Attention Review 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH STATS 0BSCI3 W . 
Consideration of the Status of SCHULTZ, JOSEPH B PRISON NO. 
Tile above-entitled natter came on for consideration before tfre-tftatr 
of Pardons on the 23rd day of September, 1993, for: 
12599 
17S75 
SPECIAL ATTENTION REVIEW 
After a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
makes tne following decision and order: 
RESULTS 
Amend parole agreement to add: CCC until stable. 
1 Successfully complete Mental Health Therapy. 
2 Take medications if prescribed. 
3 Pay restitution of TBD. 
4 Have no contact with the victim. 
5 Enter CCC until stabilized. 
No Crime Sent Case lo< Judge Expiration 
10/16/1998 
10/16/1998 
1 CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 1-15 15274 
2 CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 1-15 15274 
tfAHLQUIST 
WAHLQUIST 
This decision is subject to review and modification by the'Board of Pardons" at 
any time until actual release from custody. 
By order of the Board of Pardons of tne State of Utah; I have this date 
23rd day of September, 1993, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
on benalf of the State of Utahd' Board of Papons. _ 
^'i U 
u fi&ffk: 
ADDENDUM D 
Parole Agreement 
EXHIBIT E 
Michael O. Leavtti /*$>'""%?& 
Governor A X ^ | r X £ \ Members 
Michas! R. Stbbett «*^; \h*G&jf\ \*\ Donald E. Blanchard 
Chairman $g* re^Nfl l%* H.L (Peta) Haun 
i >nj ^ % C u r 1 ( j ^ Gamer 
X ^ ' Cheryl Hansen 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAROLE AGREEMENT 
Name: SCHULTZ, JOSEPH B OBSCIS No* 12599 USP No- 17875 
*
 a S r e e t o b e ^ i r e c t e d and superv i sed by a g e n t s of t h e Utah S t a t e Department 
o f C o r r e c t i o n s and w i l l a b i d e t h e following c o n d i t i o n s of ray pa ro l e ; 
1 . RELEASE: On t h e day of my re l ease from the i n s t i t u t i o n or conf inement , 
I w i l l r e p o r t t o my a s s i g n e d Parole Agent , u n l e s s o t h e r w i s e approved in 
w r i t i n g from t h e p a r o l e o f f i c e . 
2 . ABSCONDING: ^ I w i l l n o t abscond from p a r o l e s u p e r v i s i o n : 
A, R e p o r t i n g : I w i l l r e p o r t as d i r e c t e d by t h e Department of C o r r e c t i o n s 
B, R e s i d e n c e : I w i l l e s t a b l i s h and r e s i d e a t a r e s i d e n c e of r eco rd and 
w i l l n o t change my r e s i dence w i t h o u t f i r s t o b t a i n i n g permiss ion from 
my p a r o l e a g e n t . 
C, Leav ing t h e S t a t e : I w i l l not l e a v e my s t a t e of r e s i d e n c e , even 
b r i e f l y , o r any o t h e r s t a t e to which I am r e l e a s e d or t r a n s f e r r e d 
w i t h o u t p r i o r w r i t t e n permiss ion from my p a r o l e a g e n t . 
3 . CONDUCT: I w i l l obey a l l S t a t e , F e d e r a l and m u n i c i p a l laws. If 
a r r e s t e d , c i t e d o r q u e s t i o n e d by a peace o f f i c e r , I w i l l no t i fy my 
p a r o l e a g e n t w i t h i n 58 hou r s of the i n c i d e n t . 
4 . HOrcE VISITS: I w i l l p e r m i t v i s i t s t o my p l a c e of r e s i d e n c e bv agen t s of 
A d u l t P r o b a t i o n and P a r o l e f o r the purpose of e n s u r i n g compliance wi th the 
c o n d i t i o n s o f my p a r o l e . I wi l l n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h requi rement ; i . e . 
h a v i n g v i c i o u s d o g s , p e r i m e t e r s e c u r i t y d o o r s , r e f u s i n g to open the door , 
e t c . 
5 . SEARCHES: I w i l l p e r m i t agents of Adul t P r o b a t i o n and Parole to s ea rch 
my p e r s o n , r e s i d e n c e , v e h i c l e or any o t h e r p r o p e r t y under my c o n t r o l ? 
w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t , a t any time, day or n i g h t , upon reasonable s u s p i c i o n 
t o e n s u r e c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s of my p a r o l e . 
6 . WEAPONS: I w i l l n o t own, pos se s s , have under my c o n t r o l or in my 
c u s t o d y any e x p l o s i v e s , f i rearms or dangerous weapons as defined in Utah 
Code A n n o t a t e d . S e c t i o n 76—10-501, a s amended. 
7 . EMPLOYMENT: U n l e s s o t h e r w i s e au thor i zed by my p a r o l e a g e n t , I w i l l s eek , 
o b t a i n and m a i n t a i n v e r i f i a b l e , l awfu l f u l l - t i m e employment (32 hours per 
week minimum) a s approved by my p a r o l e a g e n t . I w i l l n o t i f y my p a r o l e 
a e e n t of any change i n employment w i t h i n 48 h o u r s . 
8 . ASSOCIATION: I w i l l n o t knowingly a s s o c i a t e w i t h any person who i s 
i n v o l v e d i n c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y or who has been c o n v i c t e d of a f e l o n y , 
w i t h o u t a p p r o v a l from my parole a g e n t . 
9 . CHEMICAL ANALYSIS: I w i l l submit to t e s t of my b r e a t h , body f lu ids or h a i r 
t o e n s u r e c o m p l i a n c e w i t h my paro le ag reemen t .
 # 
1 0 . TRUTHFULNESS: I w i l l be c o o p e r a t i v e , compl i an t and t r u t h f u l in a l l my 
d e a l i n g s w i t h A d u l t P r o b a t i o n and P a r o l e . 
1 1 . SPECIAL COTOITIONS: I w i l l : ,
 # , „ , , u -
^ 1 S u c c e s s f u l l y complete Menta l H e a l t h Therapy* 
^ Take m e d i c a t i o n s if p r e s c r i b e d . 
Pay r e s t i t u t i o n of $TBD CASE#. 
% Have no c o n t a c t with the v i c t i m . 
v j 5 E n t e r CCC u n t i l s t a b i l i z e d . . 
I h a v e r e a d , u n d e r s t a n d and a g r e e to be bound by t h i s a g r e e m e n t . If I v i o l a t e 
a n v of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h i s agreement , t he Board of Pardons may revoke my 
? S 2 o l i o £ t h S DepiSfeaUnt o f C o r r o c t i o n ^ m a y t a k e o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e a c t i o n 
a g a i n s t me. 
/)-^-93 SIGNED: 
DATE 
U f c g R > WITNESSED * Y * ~ ^ r f ^ 
ATE1 
AUTHORIZED BY: - ' / ' . „ , v ' ' ™ . ™ ^ ^ BOARD OF PARDONS 
ADDENDUM E 
Termination Hearing 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UiAH STAVE 0BSCISvN0, 1259*1 
ride rat ion >i the Status of SCJiULTZL^JOS£PH_B _ _ PRISON NO. _ 17875 
anovo-eat it ur! matter came on for consideration before che Utah State Board 
Virions on the 3rd day of September, W M , for: 
I£R41NATI0tf HEARING 
*r a review of the submitted information and good cause appearing, the Board 
is tfk following decision and or3er; 
RESULTS 
Statutory termination of sentence and 
parole effective 10/23/1900. 
PAROLE OFFICER: DONALD BLAIR/REGION III, 
Grids 
^JRIMLIIAL 'I^ITCIDI: 
CRIMINAL HO-IICIDE 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Sent Case No^ 
1-15 152 74 
0-5 15274 
Judge 
"WAHLQUTST 
WAHLQUIST 
WAHLQUIST 
Expiration 
"107T67TJ98 
10/16/1993 
10/16/1988 
is decision is subject to review and modification by the Board of Pardons at 
/ time until actual release from custody. 
order of the Bo-ird of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have this date 
1 day of September, l?9o, affixed my signature as Chairman for and 
behalf of the State of Utah, Board of Pardons, 
/L^ny .j£^sA&4-
^ " M. R. SibbettV Chairman 
ADDENDUM F 
Final Decision of the Restitution Hearing 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SIATE 0BSCI3 NO. 12599 
^deration of taa Status of SCHULTZ, JOSEPH B PRISON NO, 17875 
abo^e-eni Ulad matter came on for consideration before the Utah State Board 
'ardoasoa the 24th day of October, 1995, for; 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
a review of the submitted Information and good cause appearing, the Board 
uie io'l loving decision and order-; 
RESULTS 
Other.. Warrant #96-1229 issued on 
10/24/1.99') to toll supervision date as of 
10/24/1096. ' Mr. Scaultz is to be placed 
anaar ;rrre«t and released on iiis Ovm Recognisance 
pending a Parole Violation Hearing 
badoca tho Board of Pardons 
and to provide appropriate time for 
further ie^H I rasearc.i. 
Final decision of the hearing neld on 
10/23/1975. 
dRIMIiiAL HC^UGIDE 
CRIMINAL' HOMICIDE 
Seat v;asa 
"l 15' 132/4 
1 15 15274 
Ho Judge 
"VMJLQUIST 
WAHLQUIST 
Exp.i ration 
16/16/1998 
10/16/1998-
Is •irc'.^ Lovi U subject to revi?^ and mod'.flection by the Board of. Pardons at 
r Limp uatli actual release from custo Iv• 
o.!"d-rr o;* tiv> Boa-ri of Pardons of the State of Utah, I have tftis date 
tn day of Occober, 1996, affixed -ray.-signature as Chairman for and 
ba •!.ai.»; of tn:j Stat* o Utah, Board of Pardons 
M, R. S.ibbett, 'Chairman 
JOSEPH fe.sfefa, • f | | § |
 /7^75 
'+0000**' 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RATIONALE FOR DECISION ON /d'23-%
 TO ^kSPTVVdA/ 
Hearing Date "Hearing Type 
*e Board of Pardons' decision is based on the following factors: 
5 S M M
™
S
 MITIGATING 
cvt-Hnoi h- f • PfTHTOER'S BACKGROUND BiHSAXffifi 
Criminal history significantly.u**wwepresented by guidelines 
n i s f e y ^ P s f e a r $ f f - f f i e ? m V i C t i 0 M * n d / ° r 8 ? l J d ™"> . . . 
= SKSJ of asSKSfS £ S^JBiSfHuS^aaS?™!1. : : : z f c 
Ss
 n . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE 
— 7 ^ %se o t* eapons or dangerous instrumentalities 
_vC_ Demonstration of extreme cruelty or depravity Sf 
»£??!„?* P o s^ 1 0? of trust, special skill, or responsibility 
Multiple incidents and/or victims »F"»»*u«"y 
Personal gain reaped from the offense . . . . . . . 
M n H v o ,. v OFFENDER'S TRAITS DURING THE OFFENSE } 
o«i- ? (intentional, premeditated zfi. impulsive, reactionary) . 
S£i?. ( o^ a n x z? r« l e ? d e r 2fi- follower, minimal participant) . 
Obstruction of justice vs.. early withdrawal or self-surrender \ 
/ j,. . . . , ,
 L VICTW CHARACTERISTICS 
~-^ P 5 I C ? ^ ° I ^ J ^ y (physical, emotional, financial, social) 
—*- 5fi?4™Vfly v u^? raBle victln.xft. aggressive or provoking victim _^  
Victim m position of authority over offender •".«"«« 
.
 T . OFFENDER'S PRESENT CHARACTERISTICS 
. uenial or minimization vs.. complete acceptance of responsibility 
—rp^ vZ?eaiedl n«»erous yj|. first incarceration -or parole revocation ~~^— 
—^— £?te?V ot *£I2°£se. and apparent motivation to rehabilitate . . . 
5i??i3n!;f:?_?"fLf?!:e,?^2* efforts to, pay restitution Szf 
Degree of meaningful support system 
Nature and stability of release plans ' . ' . ' . ' . ' . ' " -
Unusual institutional vulnerability (due to age, health, other) 
Overall rehabilitative progress and promise . . . . . . . . . . 
Lengthy history of alcohol/drug abuse vs.. apparent rehabilitation 
Substantial Continuous period in custody on other charges . . . 
•' Likely release to detainer T . . . . 
OTHER r y 
^2/t-fas/u ^6^ihirr>^ tUyj&^P* Chj^ik ^ar^fk^ * 
0ctay,/9f/ /U ^^J^/ 
Date" - ' Board Member 
J3 
ADDENDUM G 
Restitution Hearing 
EXHIBIT G 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE 
I n t h e m a t t e r o f 
JOSEPH SCHULTZ 
USP #178675 
RESTITUTION HEARING 
HELD OCTOBER 23, 1996 
BEFORE 
LEWIS ESCOBAR, HEARING OFFICER 
T r a j r t s cx i b c r 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
REGIONAL REPORTING SERVICES 
652 Jefferson Cove 
1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2
 HEARING OFFICER: Good morning. I'm Lewis 
3 Escobar, the hearing officer for the Board of Pardons. 
4 This is a restitution hearing for Joseph V. Schultz, USP 
5 #17875. 
6 I s t h a t you, s i r? 
7
 MR. SCHULTZ: Yes, t h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
8
 HEARING OFFICER: Mr. Schul tz , I ' l l be taking 
9 tes t imony from you. Can you p l ea se r a i s e your right hand? 
1 0
 JOSEPH SCHULTZ 
1 1 1 having f i r s t been duly sworn, t e s t i f i e d upon 
1 2
 J oath as f o l l o w s : 
13 MR. BOWEN: Mr. Escobar, for t h e record I 
14 wondered i f you r e c e i v e d the communication we sent? 
15 1 HEARING OFFICER: Y e s . I was g o i n g t o mention 
16} t h a t . We do have a l e t t e r submitted by J . Thomas Bowen and 
17 I t h i s i s , we r e c e i v e d a f a x o n October 22nd of 1996 at 23:10 
18 hou r s and we have what appears t o be an o r i g i n a l copy of 
19 t h e fax, h a n d - d e l i v e r e d on October 23rd of 1996. 
20 The r ea son f o r this r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g is, f i r s t 
21 of a l l , i s a t t he r e q u e s t of Mr. Schu l t z , based on the fac t 
22 t h a t he was asked t o s i g n a waiver t o the t r u t h of the 
23 r e s t i t u t i o n claimed by t h e vict ims of $3 ,798 .42 . 
24 EXAMINATION 
25 BY HEARING OFFICER: 
1
 Q Is that correct, sir? 
2 A Yes. 
3 HEARING OFFICER: In this letter submitted by Mr. 
4=1 Bowen there's some issues that he has raised. 
5 J And I assume that is you, Mr. Bowen? 
6 MR. BOWEN: That is correct, yes. 
7 HEARING OFFICER: One of the issues is that 
8 there's no legal basis for this and a request that this 
9 hearing be stricken, is that correct? 
10 MR. BOWEN: That is correct. 
11 HEARING OFFICER: I will rule on this motion to 
12 strike this hearing as you request, Mr. Bowen, based on the 
13 fact that we do have legal basis. Mr. Schultz is on parole 
14 and his legislative termination will not occur until 
15 October 25th of 1996. Based on that I will rule to 
16 continue with this hearing. Based on that we'll go ahead. 
17 Q (BY HEARING OFFICER) Mr. Schultz, what is your 
18 contention as to why, is it your belief that you do not owe 
19 t h i s r e s t i t u t i o n ? 
20 A I believe I do not owe th is res t i tu t ion . 
21 Q Go ahead and te l l me why you don't think that you 
22 o w e t h e m o n e y . 
23 A I believe I don't owe th is res t i tu t ion because 
24 the re was no r e s t i t u t i o n ordered by the court. There's no 
25 provisions, I took my case to a jury t r i a l . I was 
1 convicted by a jury. I was sentenced by the judge. There 
2 was no restitution ordered. Had the whole Board of Pardons 
3 been standing next to the judge at the time of my 
4 sentencing, they would not have been able to implement 
5 restitution. They weren't given the authority to implement 
6 restitution until 1986. That precedes my conviction by 
7 three years. I believe cases adjudicated before the Board 
8 of Pardons was given the authority to impose restitution do 
9 not apply in this case. 
1 0
 HEARING OFFICER: Okay, any other reasons? 
1 1
 MR- BOWEN: If I might interject, wefve raised a 
12 number of issues in the letter. We believe also this 
13 I constitutes double jeopardy, particularly citing the 
14 hearing officer of the United States versus Myers which is 
1 5 I a n E l e v e n t h . C i r c u i t c a s e and tn.e U n i t e d . S t a t e s ve r sus 
16 Gazelle which is a Tenth Circuit case and the United States 
17 versus Halper which is a United States Supreme Court case, 
18 all of which have held that the double jeopardy clause bars 
19 the imposition of a civil penalty subsequent to criminal 
20 prosecution and punishment. We believe that it's beyond 
21 the jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons, particularly as 
22 Mr. Schultz has said, because no restitution has ever been 
23 awarded in this particular case. It wasn't ordered by the 
24 trial judge and has not previously been ordered by the 
25 Board and it» s only because of the intervention of Governor 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
1 5 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
L e a v i t t 1 s o f f i ce t h a t t h i s ma t t e r has come forward. 
HEARING OFFICER. Close t o t h a t , l e t me ask you 
f i r s t of a l l what the i n t e r j e c t i o n i s from Mr. Leavitt, 
from the governor? I 'm not aware of i t . 
MR. BOWEN: I t ' s my unders tanding t h a t one of the 
v i c t i m s in t h i s case , f o r personal reasons, wrote a l e t t e r 
t o Governor L e a v i t t and ask Governor L e a v i t t ' s office to 
i n v e s t i g a t e the fac t t h a t no r e s t i t u t i o n had be ordered or 
t o o r d e r Mr. Schultz t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n . The reason for 
t h a t i s because of an on-going problem with ch i ld support 
and t h a t ' s simply the reason. 
HEARING OFFICER: To my knowledge the governor's 
o f f i c e rece ived a, I d o n ' t know whether i t was a l e t t e r or 
a t e l e p h o n e c a l l or whatever, and they, not having any 
knowledge of t h i s m a t t e r , re fe r red i t back to the 
Depar tment of C o r r e c t i o n s . The Department of Corrections, 
and I 'm t a l k i n g about t h e adminis t ra t ion p a r t , not being 
f a m i l i a r wi th t h i s , they deferred t o the Board of Pardons 
and submi t t ed the claim from the v i c t im . The victim, t h i s 
i s ray assumption, I d o n ' t know i f t h i s i s t he case, the 
v i c t i m forwarded t h i s claim t o the governor and the 
g o v e r n o r de fe r r ed t o t h e Department of Cor rec t ions . The 
Depar tment of Cor rec t ions sent i t t o u s . 
I d o n ' t know t h a t you a re aware of the claim or 
have seen any. 
1
 MR- BOWEN: We have not seen the claim but any 
2 c la im, i t ' s my understanding without seeing the claim 
3 though i s t h a t i t has t o be a t l e a s t 13 years o ld . There 
4 were s e v e r a l remedies tha t were a v a i l a b l e to her that she 
5 never took and so we've got some s e r i o u s s t a t u t e of 
6 l i m i t a t i o n problems and again we ' re back on the question of 
7 1 whether o r no t a c i v i l penalty i s now a t tempt ing to be 
8 imposed upon Mr. Schu l tz as punishment for h i s crime. 
9 HEARING OFFICER: Right . Okay, t o answer t h a t , 
10 t h e Board g r a n t e d Mr. Schultz a c o n d i t i o n a l paro le . One of 
11 t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p a r o l e vas t h a t he pay r e s t i t u t i o n to be 
12 de t e rmined . Mr. Schu l tz accepted those condi t ions on 
13 October 26th of 1993 and on November 30th, 1993, he signed 
14 such accep tance be ing witnessed by Mr. J e f f e r y Cloud, a 
15 parole officer, on November 30th of 1993 . Based on that 
16 1 there's an expectation from the Board of Pardons that Mr. 
17! Schultz agreed to pay restitution. However--
18 THE WITNESS: I don't believe that constitutes an 
19 agreement. Mr. Bowen has been on a retainer for years 
2 0 waiting for the Board of Pardons to set an amount of 
21 restitution. Thirty-five hours before my sentence and 
22 parole is due to terminate you've come up with this. I 
23 have done nothing to violate my parole up to this point. 
24 At anytime in there, you've had eight years to set this 
25 amount. At anytime had you set this amount this would have 
11 b e e n going t o c o u r t . 
2
 MR. BOWEN: L e t me a l s o say t h a t t h e r e vas a 
3 t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g t h a t was h e l d by t h e Board on the t h i r d 
4 of September of t h i s y e a r and t h e r e s u l t s of t h a t were t h a t 
5 h e be t e r m i n a t e d from h i s s en t ence e f f e c t i v e 10/25/96. 
6 J T h e r e i s no r e q u i r e m e n t in t h a t t e r m i n a t i o n h e a r i n g t h a t 
7 1 any r e s t i t u t i o n be p a i d and t h e r e ' s been no change of 
8 c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i n c e t h a t : time. Any f a c t s , any evidence was 
9 a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Board a t t h a t t ime and t h e y d i d n ' t impose 
10 r e s t i t u t i o n . 
1 1 HEARING OFFICER: Very w e l l . S t i l l t h e fact 
12 r e m a i n s t h a t t h e r e s t i t u t i o n was t o be d e t e r m i n e d . Mr. 
13 S c h u l t z a c c e p t e d t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s . Now t h e ques t ion i s i f 
14 t h e Board ha s t h e power or a u t h o r i t y t o impose r e s t i t u t i o n 
1 5 I o n c a s e s w h e r e t h e c o u r t have n o t . And t h a t i s t he 
16 q u e s t i o n t h a t you h a v e r a i s e d h e r e i n y o u r l e t t e r . I 'm not 
17 g o i n g t o d w e l l i n t o t h a t . I w i l l t e l l you t h a t th i s m a t t e r 
18 i s u n d e r r ev i ew by t h e a p p e l l a n t c o u r t a t t h i s poin t , so 
19 u n t i l t h i s i s d e c i d e d I c a n ' t t e l l you w h e t h e r t h e Eoard 
2 0 h a s o r d o e s n ' t h a v e . 
2 1 MR. BOWEN: I r e p r e s e n t two of t h e p a r t i e s t h a t 
22 a r e on a p p e a l . 
23 HEARING OFFICER: So you a r e f a m i l i a r with i t . 
24 MR. BOWEN: I am. 
25 HEARING OFFICER: Mr. B l a i r , do you have anything 
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t h a t you 'd l i k e to ask? 
MR. BLAIR: IT d j u s t l i k e t o i n t e r j e c t a brief 
h i s t o r y h e r e of what has t r ansp i red . I became the of f ice r 
on t h i s c a s e , I b e l i e v e Ji ly of t h i s yea r . P r io r to t h a t 
s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s t o g a i n r e s t i t u t i o n information were made 
by s e v e r a l o t h e r p a r o l e off icers a re a l l documented in the 
f i l e . Contact was made with the v i c t i m . However, amounts 
were not ga ined , t h e r e f o r e no r e s t i t u t i o n amount was made. 
I a t t empted t o reach h e r just before r eques t ing this case 
b e l e g i s l a t i v e l y terminated and was unable to do so. But 
t h e most r e c e n t con tac t with the v i c t im was in January, or 
e x c u s e me, t h a t would have been December of 1995. At t h a t 
t i m e she d i d not supply any informat ion t o the officer 
r e g a r d i n g r e s t i t u t i o n information, t h e r e f o r e he was unable 
t o de te rmine any type of r e s t i t u t i o n . 
During my supervis ion Mr. Schul tz has been 
compl i an t w i th the terms of p a r o l e , obviously , and I 've had 
no problem wi th him. 
HEARING OFFICER: That i s c e r t a i n l y a concern 
20 t h a t t h e v i c t i m waited t h i s long t o submit r e s t i t u t i o n when 
21 s e v e r a l a t t e m p t s were made by Adult Probat ion and Parole t o 
22 g a i n t h a t . 
23 And t o answer your comment, Mr. Schul tz , as to 
24 why we wa i t ed t h i s long i s s;imply because the Board d i d n ' t 
25 know what amounts, i f any, were and t h i s i s why th is 
1 r e s t i t u t i o n h e a r i n g has been convened a t your request, of 
2 course . But one of t h e issues here i s t h a t we were not 
3 a f ford ing you due p r o c e s s , t h i s i s why we have this hearing 
4 i s to afford you t h a t process, s i r . 
5 I THE WITNESS : I understand. 
6
 I HEARING OFFICER: Anything e l s e t h a t anyone e l se 
7 has? 
8 THE WITNESS: My contention is right up front, I 
9 am paying no restitution regardless of the outcome of this 
10 hearing. If you wish to pursue the matter beyond midnight 
11J tomorrow night when my termination is supposed to take 
12 effect you can have him take me into custody and take me 
13 back into the prison. 
14 HEARING OFFICER: Sir, you better reconsider what 
15 you say. 
16 THE WITNESS: There is no reconsideration. 
17 HEARING OFFICER: That is certainly an option to 
18 be taken, okay? Because ray initial thought was to take 
19 this matter under advisement so that the Board can gather, 
2 0 I you can submit all evidence and the Board can make a 
21 ruling. But if you are not taking--let me warn you that if 
22 you do not take responsibility for your actions then 
23 certainly you will be in violation of your parole terms and 
24 that is an option. The Board can issue a warrant. We can 
25 detain you right now and the Board will issue a warrant, 
1 okay? I'm just warning you. 
2 T H E
 WITNESS: I've put up with to much shit from 
3 you people. I W e done twice the matrix on this crime 
4 j lacking 35 hours. I've completed three years of parole. 
51 HEARING OFFICER: Would you like to talk to him 
6 J before I make the rule? 
7
 j MR. BOWEN: Yes, let me do so. 
8
 Mr. Escobar, let me also point out that it seems 
9 to me that there are certain statutory requirements even 
10 assuming that this Board has the authority to impose 
11 restitution which we do not recognize, but nevertheless, if 
12 it does there are statutory requirements in the Utah Code. 
13 Specifically I would site 76-3-2013 (b) and 77-27-62 which 
14 requires certain things to occur in a restitution hearing. 
15 One on which it seems to me is the presence of the victim 
16 to testify and be subject to cross-examination concerning 
17 the amount of the claim. Now since none of that has 
18 occurred today it appears to me that this Board has no 
19 other choice but that to deny any request for restitution 
20 and to dismiss the hearing because there's no evidence in 
21 front of the Board. 
22 HEARING OFFICER: First of all, the victim was 
23 notified with ample time. The victim has been in 
24 telephonic communications with the Board and the victim, 
25 for whatever reason, is not present and I hear your 
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comment, your motion. Based on that, that is why I was 
going to continue this matter and take it under advisement 
and appraise the Board of the fact that the victim chose 
not to attend this meeting. 
Q (BY HEARING OFFICER) Mr. Schultz, do you still 
have that desire to be taken in? 
MR. BOWEN: No, he doesn't. He's upset. When 
you see the light at the end of the tunnel and it's getting 
brighter and brighter it'sa little difficult to have to 
come back here this close--
11 I HEARING OFFICER: I, sir, do not think it would 
12 be necessary but if you do want too I can order him to take 
13 you right in. 
14 THE WITNESS: I truthfully, for me this is not a 
±5 mor-al issue, this is a legal issue and I do not believe I 
16 legally owe this amount. 
17 HEARING OFFICER: I have taken your statements 
18 into consideration, sir, and I will certainly appraise the 
19 I Board of your desire not to pay restitution based on the 
20 issues that your attorney has raised. 
21 I will take this matter under advisement and, Mr. 
22 Schultz, you will be notified of whatever decision the 
23 Board makes. 
24 MR. BOWEN: Thank you. 
25 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t t h e f o r e g o i n g t r a n s c r i p t 
i n t h e above m e n t i o n e d hear ing h e l d b e f o r e t h e Boaid of 
P a r d o n s on O c t o b e r 2 3 , 1996 was t r a n s c r i b e d 
from t h e an d u p l i c a t e d audio t a p e , and i s a f u l l and 
c o m p l e t e t r a n s c r i p t i o n conta ined i n p a g e s 3 through 28, 
i n c l u s i v e , t o t h e b e s t of my a b i l i t y . 
S i g n e d t h i s 16th day of March, 1997 in Sandy, 
U t a h . 
Carolyn E r i c k s o n 
C e r t i f i e d S h o r t h a n d Reporter 
C e r t i f i e d Cour t T ra ns c r i be r 
My Commission e x p i r e s May 4, 1998 
ADDENDUM H 
Letter from Donald Blair, Parole Agent 
EXHIBIT H 
to 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FIELD OPERATIONS - REGION lif 
Raymond H Wahl, Director 
Don Blackburn, Regional Administrator 
Michael 0- Leavitt 
Governor 
0. Lane McCotter 
Executive Director 
October 25, 1996 
JOSEPH SCHULTZ, USP # 17875 
764 North 900 West, Apt #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Dear Mr Schultz: 
This letter is to inform you of the results of a hearing conducted by the Utah Board of Pardons 
and Parole on October 24, 1996. 
The Board of Pardons and Parole conducted a hearing specifically on your restitution issue and 
decided to have a full hearing before the Utah Board of Pardons at a later date. 
At that hearing, the Board of Pardons and Parole pulled your October 25,1996 termination date 
until this restitution issue is resolved before them 
Because of this, it is important that you contact this office via telephone to set up an appointment 
with this agent concerning the above mentioned matter. You must contact this office b> 
November 5, 1996. 
You must also remember your parole termination date has been pulled and you are still on parole 
and therefore, subject to the terms and conditions of your Parole Agreement. Thank you for your 
quick response to this letter. Please contact me at 239-2204. 
DONALD BLAIR 
Parole Agent 
g:\bvreeken 
ADDENDUM I 
Special Attention Hearing 
EXHIBIT I 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C o n s i d e r a t i o n of cne S t a t u s of SOrfULIZ, JoSZPri 3 
"JrAH ST47E QZSCIS ;I0. 
Pill SON iJO. 
12599 
17 37 * 
-Ui.3 a o o v e r - a n t i t l e d n u t t e r came on f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n b e f o r e t h e Utah Stats. 3oard 
of P a r d o n s on t h e 5 m day of A u g u s t , 1 9 9 7 , fo r ; 
A f t e r a r e v i e w ox t h e s u b m i t t e d i n f o r m a t i o n and ?ood cause a p p e a r i n g , the 3oard 
aa/.a.s t a e f o l l o w i n g d e c i s i o n and o r i e r : 
x a r n i n a t e s e n t e n c e and p a r o l e e f f e c t i v e 
j > 0 / p 4 / 1 9 ? 7 , 02A2JL: Request fo r r e s t i t u t i o n 
of $3793 .43 i s t o be forwarded t o t a e 
Sen tBnc in^ C o u r t f o r a Civi l Judgeaeiii: . 
F i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e aearing held on 
0 4 / 2 2 / 1 9 9 7 . 
PAROLE OFFICER: DAVID BOSCARENO/REGIOtf I I I / S L C . 
^o Cr^ne S e a t Case eJo. Jud^e 
CRl:i£NAL H0.4ICIDE 1-15 15274 
1-15 15274 
WAHLQUIST 
w ACQUIS T 
•kxpicfcti. 
10/15/13^8 
10/16/1993 
T.iis d e c i s i o n i s subject t o review and modification oy the Board of Pardons a t 
uu7 t la.3 u n t i l a c c i a l r e lease from, cus tody . 
3y o r d e r of t a e BDarl of Pardons of r ae State of Utaa, I nave t h i s data 
5xa day of Augus t , 1997, a f f i zed my s ieaa tu re as Chaiman t o r and 
on b e h a l f of t h e S t a t e of Utah, 3oard of Pardons. 
xJSett, Cnaippan 
ADDENDUM J 
Copy of envelope from the Department of Corrections 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
FIELD OPERATIONS • REGION III 
275 East 200 South. Suite 100 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
1 
USPOSi'AGF * 
~- H ? '7 
?:• 
ADmSSC
°*KCTmmmo 
JOSEPH &. SCHULTz. 
S X C , O T T ^ . 8HUy 
w w i f e / A D ^ H..I..!,.l...fi..,ll.li,„t,.HI,,..i.l.,ill.iiiM 
ADDENDUM K 
Order of Restitution 
Michael 0. Leavitt 
Governor 
Michael R. SlbtKtt 
Chairman 
Members 
Donald E. Blanchard 
H.L (Pete) Haun 
Curtis L Garner 
Chery\ Hansen 
BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
v. 
Joseph B. Schultz 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant, 
«OQ1 <J-P i b p 12-. 01 
'ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
s-C , " J STT.iCT COii?J 
Z3l°\f l$tf 
Case No. 15294 
John F. Wahlquist, Judge 
The Board of Pardons and Parole, having reviewed its file, finds that Joseph B. Schultz has 
outstanding restitution, that has not been paid, in the amount of $3,798.43 case No. 15294 
Wherefore, the Board makes the following: 
ORDER OF RESTITUTION 
1. Defendant shall pay $3,798.43 in restitution to: Holly 0. Everton 
This order shall be forwarded to the District Court which sentenced Mr. Joseph B Schultz, 
persuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 77-27-6(4), and shall constitute a lien against him when entered 
on the court's docket. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 8th day of September, 1997. 
BY THE BOARD: 
m 
Michael R. Sibbett, Chairman 
Utah Board of Pardons and Parole 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this \ 7 day of 
MAILING CF.RTIFICATF. 
Ord T J f ^ ° , C e r t i f y ^ ° n ^ ^ ^ ° f - ^ - ' ! " 7 ' ! Sent a ^ « * C 0 ^ c t copy of the foregoin, iv of Restitution, postage pre-paid, to: S & 
John F.Wahlquist, Judge 
Second District Court 
2549 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Z^a^fry-K-y 
#15274 
"^> nr\o An 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on the, SA_ day of frpfmbtr , 1997,1 sent a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing order of restitution, postage pre-paid, to 
Joseph B Schultz,USP#17875 
Address unknown 
W^ZCh^^^cl. / 7 Z ^ P ^ ^ > ^ ^ 
#15274 
$3,798 43 
ADDENDUM L 
Writ of Continuing Garnishment (Wage) 
^ 0 / s /+ s~ Bar Number 
-fry "?/\ fS'fa 
ZIP lity, Staft, 2 
> l' 
7 — ; — • — • • i , — <- ^ 71 t-
: lephone / .. •* ' '- " ' 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATftOF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER, O G D E N T ^ E P A R T M E N T / 
y 
/6/iy fcV?Trok' Plaintiff, ) WRITOFCONTINUiNG'^y 
) GARNISHMENf/O^age)"'' 
) .. ' N / ^ / 
~~f /
 x o s»~ / t Defendant ) Civil Number: fen/my 
JpSffd &. bffaL + Z. GanushceW ) ,J f , J . \ 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO GARNISHEE: ' 
You are hereby ordered by the Court to hold a portion of Defendant(s)' pension, wages or other income (not to 
:xceedthe outstanding amount owed on the judgment or order and court approved costs in this matter, being 
' — 7 - ' **- * 'w ) due at the next payday and continuing at each payday thereafter for a period of 120 
lays from the date this Writ was served upon you or, in the case of multiple garnishments, from the date this garnish-
ment becomes effective, as calculated pursuant to the attached questions, which are called Interrogatories or the at-
:ached Affidavit of Garnishee as to Continuing Garnishment. To determine'the income available for garnishment at 
:he next (first) payday, you are required to answer the attached Interrogatories and file your answer with the Clerk of 
:he Court within five (5) business days of the date this Writ is served upon you or, in case of multiple garnishments, 
within five (5) business days after this Writ becomes effective. For each subsequent payday thereafter until the termina-
tion of this Writ, you are required to complete the attached Affidavit as to Continuing Garnishment (copy the attached 
Affidavit form for completion each payday) and file said Affidavit with the Clerk of the Court within five (5) business 
days after such payday. The address of the Clerk is 2525 Grant Ave., Ogden, UT 84401. You are also required to send 
a copy of your initial Interrogatory answers and subsequent Affidavits to the Plaintiff at the following ad-
dress:' - ^ ^ / / / . />/?? S'- rsf- /ft X / / A ? . 
MULTIPLE WRJT^OF CONTINUING GARNISHMENT may be served upon you for the same Defendant. Only 
one Writ of Garnishment (continuing or otherwise), may be in effect and satisfied at ©ne time. When more than one 
Writ of Garnishment is served upon you against earnings due to the same Defendant, the Writs shall be satisfied in the 
order of service on you. If this Writ of Continuing Garnishment \i serVed upon you While a previous Writ is still in 
effect, you shall respond to this Writ with a statement that you have beenfseiv&i previously with one or more Writs of 
Garnishment against earnings and you shall specify the date on which'all Writs previously served are expected to 
terminate. 
If you fail to answer the Interrogatories or to file subsequent Affidavits as set forth a.bove, the judgment creditor 
may ask the Court to make you pay the amount you should have withheld. 
If you owe or will owe money to Defendant(s) which are subjects to this Writ, you shall irrimed.ately mail, by first 
class mail, a copy of the Writ and your initial Interrogatory answers, the Notice of Garnishment and Exceptions and 
two (2) copies of the Request for Hearing to the Defendant(s) at the last known address of the Defendant(s) shown on 
your records at the time of the service of this Writ. In lieu of mailing, you may hand deliver a copy of these documents 
to the Defendant(s). In the case of multiple garnishments, this mailing or delivery to Defendant(s) shall occur imme-
diately after this Writ becomes effective. You shall provide notice to the Defendant(s) of amounts attached in subse-
quent pay periods. 
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Defendant(s)5 earnings or income to be held 
at the next payday as shown by your answers. You may, in the alternative, send the money to the Court, to the Plaintiff 
or to the,PkintifPs attorney or hold the money until further order of the Court. The portion of Defendant(s)' earnings 
or income Hekfat? eacfh subsequent payday as shown by the applicable Affidavit may be sent to the Court, to Plaintiff, 
or to Plaintiffs attorney. 
'v YOU SHALL PAY to E)'efendant(s) the portion of Defendant(s)' earnings ;br incomeHvhicli are not held by this 
Writ of Garnishment,at th£ time the, same is normally paid to Defendant(s).
 >f ,v . 
.r-'o v".- •  "/'-pi. i / / / "" * r: ^*! 
. ISSUED this ,-.,:, .<'/. .
 t . day o f / / /- '?V^ . / ' ***fi . 
CLERK OF THE COURT , \ 
By: 
DEPUTY CLERK 
ADDENDUM M 
Memorandum Decision 
^COND DISTRICT 
2001 NOV - 1 p Li: 2 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
JOSEPH B.SCHULTZ, ; 
Defendant. ] 
H'« 
Memorandum Decision 
) Case No. 831915274 
) 2 
This controversy arose from the defendant's conviction of crimes of violence and 
serious injuries to the victim, Ms. Everton. The defendant was committed, subsequently paroled, 
and ultimately terminated from parole. 
The Board of Pardons, under the provisions of UCA 1953 , 77-27-6(4), submitted 
an order of restitution to this court to be docketed on the civil judgments docket as a lien against 
the defendant. 
The victim then proceeded to collect restitution with a wage garnishment. The 
defendant then filed an objection to the garnishment and a motion to set aside the judgment. 
There are a number of issues raised, and although not first in chronology, the 
Intervention o f t h e A t t o r n e y General on behalf pf the B o a r d of P a r d o n s w o u l d s e e m to b e 
logically first. 
The defendant has implied some sort of impropriety in violation of the sixty day 
2525 Grant Avenue / Ogden, Utah 84401 / 801-395-1121 
§>econb Bfetrfct Court 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
rule and the mysterious involvement of the Attorney General. The reality is that upon reading the 
response of the victim, it occurred to me that the order being challenged was the Board of 
Pardons' order and the Board would probably be interested in upholding the integrity of their 
efforts. It also occurred to me that a contest between the defendant's attorney and a pro se victim 
was an uneven one. I accordingly instructed my clerk to provide the Attorney Generals office 
with copies of the materials. Their involvement is in the best interests of justice. 
The exhibits contain several orders of restitution from Sept. 23, 1993 through his 
termination by the Board of Pardons on October 25, 1996. The final order is a reflection of the 
prior orders and requests that I docket the lien. 
The defendant does raise an issue of notice, but it seems clear that restitution was 
an issue from quite early on as evidenced by the restitution provision in the parole agreement 
Factually, there doesn't seem to be much of an issue with the amount of 
restitution ordered by the Board. Even if it were, the statute seems to deprive the court of 
jurisdiction to consider that issue. 
The court hereby releases the stay on enforcement of the garnishment, orders 
release of the funds held by the court to the victim and releases any order prohibiting the victim 
from pursuing any civil remedy available relating to civil judgments. 
Dated this \ tn day of November, 2001. 
Stantotf M. Tayl</r/fc>is$ict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 831915274 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail HOLLY 0 EVERTON 
CREDITOR 
2296 WEST 6000 SOUTH 
ROY, UT 84067 
Mail J. THOMAS BOWEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
935 E. SOUTH UNION AVE. 
#D-102 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84047 
Mail SHAREL S REBER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
PO BOX 140812 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84114-0857 
Mail WEBER CO ATTORNE 
ATTY 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OGDEN UT 844 01 
Date d th i s / day of /7fi7j 2 0 ^ / • 
Deputy Court J7L^p< 
Page 1 ( l a s t ) 
ADDENDUM N 
§76-3-201 U.C.A. 
PUNISHMENTS 76-3-201 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Definitions — Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution 
— Hearing, 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" includes a: 
(i) judgment of guilt; and 
(ii) plea of guilty. 
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings 
and medical expenses. 
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including the accrual of interest from the time of 
sentencing, insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmen-
tal entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c). 
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has 
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal 
activities. 
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's 
criminal activities. 
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; 
(e) to life imprisonment; 
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or 
(g) to death. 
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law 
to: 
(i) forfeit property; 
(ii) dissolve a corporation; 
(iii) suspend or cancel a license; 
(iv) permit removal of a person from office; 
(v) cite for contempt; or 
(vi) impose any other civil penalty. 
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
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(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted 
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to 
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for 
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as 
defined in Subsection (l)(e). 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in Subsections 
(4Xc) and (4)(d). 
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of 
the court shall enter an order of complete restitution as defined in 
Subsection (8)(b) on the civil judgment docket and provide notice of 
the order to the parties. 
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the 
restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the restitution 
order in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In 
addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person 
in whose favor the restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution 
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for payment of 
restitution and the victim or department elects to pursue collection of 
the order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(vii) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting 
the restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the 
remainder of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, 
Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is 
convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been 
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may 
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended 
by any governmental entity for the extradition. 
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court 
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c). 
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete 
restitution and court-ordered restitution. 
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to com-
pensate a victim for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court hav-
ing criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the 
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be 
determined as provided in Subsection (8). 
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(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for 
the decision a part of the court record. 
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to enforce the judgment, 
the defendant shall be entitled to offset any amounts that have been 
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the victim. 
(hi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when re-
corded in a judgment docket and shall have the same effect and is 
subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil action. 
Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentenc-
ing. 
(iv) The Department of Corrections shall make rules permitting the 
restitution payments to be credited to principal first and the remain-
der of payments credited to interest in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the 
defendant a full hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court 
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transporta-
tion expenses if the defendant was: 
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another 
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal 
charges; 
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and 
(iii) convicted of a crime. 
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of 
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply: 
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent 
failure to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or 
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order. 
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Sub-
section (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule: 
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported, 
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; 
and 
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported, 
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to 
each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants 
actually transported in a single trip. 
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates tha t 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in 
aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or 
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify impo-
sition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
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the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing 
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promul-
gated by the Sentencing Commission. 
(7) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, rape of 
a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, 
the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the charge is 
set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the defendant, or 
found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the 
highest minimum term in state prison. This subsection takes precedence over 
any conflicting provision of law. 
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the 
sentencing court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A 
victim of an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or 
a pattern of criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the 
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or 
pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage 
to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services 
and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, 
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with 
a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabili-
tation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and 
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-
ordered restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsec-
tion (8Kb) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the paymeut of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an 
order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and 
prolongation of the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order 
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of restitution under this subsectic 
provide restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1; 
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch. 
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1; 
1987, ch. 107, § 1; 1990, ch. 81, § 1; 1992, ch. 
142, § 1; 1993, ch. 17, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 19; 
1995, ch. I l l , § 1; 1995, ch. 117, § 1; 1995, 
ch. 301, § 1; 1995, ch. 337, § 1; 1995 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 10, § 1; 1996, ch. 40, § 1; 1996, ch. 
79, § 98; 1996, ch. 241, §§ 2, 3; 1998, ch. 149, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 270, § 15. 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment by ch. I l l , effective May 1, 1995, added 
"or for conduct for which the defendant has 
agreed to make restitution as part of a plea 
agreement" and made a related change in Sub-
section (4)(a)(i). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective 
May 1, 1995, inserted "the accrual of interest 
from the time of sentencing" in Subsection 
(lXd), changed "person adjudged guilty" to "per-
son convicted" in Subsection (2), and added 
Subsections (4)(a)(iii) and (4)(d)(iii). 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective 
May 1, 1995, added "and as further defined in 
Subsection (4)(c)" at the end of Subsection 
(l)(d); rewrote Subsection (4) to revise the cri-
teria and procedures for ordering restitution; 
added Subsection (8); and made several stylis-
tic changes. 
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective 
April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2)(g), redes-
ignated former Subsection (2Kg) as Subsection 
(2)(h), and deleted former Subsection (7)(c), 
requiring sentencing to the aggravated manda-
tory term in cases of substantial bodily injury to 
children during the commission of child kid-
napping or various listed child sexual assaults. 
The 1995 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
April 29, 1996, substituted "April 29, 1996" for 
"May 1, 1995" in Subsection (2)(g). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 40, effective 
April 29, 1996, deleted former Subsection 
(2)(g), which read: "on or after April 29,1996, to 
imprisonment at not less than five years and 
which may be for life for an offense under Title 
76, Chapter 5, Par t 4, and Sections 76-5-301.1 
and 76-5-302; or" and redesignated former Sub-
NOTES TO 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Aggravating factors. 
—Bodily injury to victim. 
—Severity of offense. 
—Sufficient. 
., substantially outweighs the need to 
section (2)(h) as Subsection (2)(g); deleted 
former Subsection (7), relating to resentencing 
of a defendant subject to mandatory sentencing 
under Subsection (6); and added Subsection (7). 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 79, effective 
April 29, 1996, in Subsection (2Kb) substituted 
"removal or disqualification from" for "removal 
from or disqualification of" and in Subsection 
(4)(a)(i) added "Section" before "77-37-2." 
The 1996 amendment by ch. 241, §§ 2 and 3, 
effective April 29, 1996, added Subsections 
(4)(a)(vii) and (4)(dXiv). 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, 
in Subsection (4)(a)(i) substituted "Subsection 
(l)(e)" for "Section 77-38-2" and deleted "and 
family member has the meaning as defined in 
Section 77-37-2" from the end and changed the 
style of the internal references in Subsections 
(5)(c)(i), (5)(c)(ii), and (8)(c). 
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, 
in Subsection (6Xe), substituted "aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances" for "aggravation 
and mitigation" and "Sentencing Commission" 
for "Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Jus-
tice" and made stylistic changes. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1995, ch. 301, 
§ 6 provides that the amendments in ch. 117 to 
Subsection (4)(a)(iii) shall merge into this sec-
tion, as amended by ch. 301, as Subsection 
(4)(aXvi). 
Laws 1995, ch. 337 was effective May 1,1995; 
however, § 76-3-201.3 postponed the amend-
ment of this section by ch. 337 until April 29, 
1996. 
Cross-References. — Commission on 
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25a-101 et 
seq. 
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq. 
Removal of officers, § 77-6-1 et seq. 
Restitution as condition of probation, § 77-
18-1. 
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule 
22, R.Crim.P. 
Special release from city or county jail, pur-
poses, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et 
seq. 
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule, 
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C. 
DECISIONS 
Arrest record. 
—Effect on sentence. 
Credit for pretrial detention. 
Discretion of court. 
Effect of noncompliance. 
Informal procedure. 
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PARDONS AND PAROLES 77-27-5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am Jur 2d Pardon and C.J.S. — 67A C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 6 
Parole §§ 10, 12, 17, 73 et seq to 8, 10, 39 to 60 
77-27-3. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 77-27-3 (L 1980, ch 15, relating to duties of the board, hearings, etc , 
§ 2, 1981, ch 59, § 3, 1983, ch 88, § 36), was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 213, § 10 
77-27-4. Chairperson and vice chairperson. 
(1) The governor shall select one of the members of the board to serve as 
chairperson and board administrator at the governor's pleasure. The chairper-
son may exercise the duties and powers, in addition to those established by this 
chapter, necessary for the administration of daily operations of the board, 
including personnel, budgetary matters, panel appointments, and scheduling 
of hearmgs. 
(2) The chairperson shall appoint a vice chairperson to act in the absence of 
the chairperson 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-4, enacted by L. 1985, ch 198, § 8 repealed former § 77-27-4 
1985, ch. 198, § 8; 1989, ch. 112, § 1; 1990, (L 1980, ch 15, § 2,1983, ch 53, § 2), relating 
ch. 195, § 3. to chairman and vice chairman and quorum of 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws board, and enacted present § 77-27-4 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority 
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and 
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A 
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except 
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released 
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, 
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The 
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in 
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings 
involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any 
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may 
designate the chair for any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution 
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence termi-
nated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed 
exammer in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other 
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not 
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with 
Section 76-3-201. 
793 
7 7 - 2 7 - 5 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's 
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law 
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction 
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations 
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are 
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents the 
obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as provided 
in Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution. 
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders 
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have 
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, 
the board shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to 
make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and proce-
dures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of 
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall 
consider the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in 
Section 76-3-202, and in accordance with Section 77-27-13. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1986, ch. 22, § 2; 1988, ch. 
172, § 2; 1990, ch. 195, § 4; 1993, ch. 38, 
§ 102; 1994, ch. 13, § 33; 1995, ch. 301, § 4; 
1996, ch. 100, § 4. 
Repeals and Reenaetments . — Laws 
1983, ch 53, § 3 repealed a former § 77-27-5 
(L 1980, ch 15, § 2), relating to per diem and 
expenses of board members, and enacted a new 
§ 77-27-5 
Laws 1985, ch 213, § 1 repealed former 
§ 77-27-5 (L 1983, ch 53, § 3), relating to 
compensation and expenses of board, and en-
acted the present section 
Amendment Notes . — The 1995 amend-
ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection 
(l)(e) and added "including restitution as pro-
vided m Section 77-27-6" at the end of Subsec-
tion (3) 
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 
1996, deleted "of Pardons and Parole" after 
"board" m Subsections (3) and (5), and added 
Subsection (6) 
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§77-27-6 (4) U.C.A. 
v v / A i i v / KJVJ UIU oxicixi iiui ^un&iuei it;gai issues, including constitutional issues 
which: 
(a) have been reviewed previously by the courts; 
(b) should have been raised during the judicial process; or 
(c) if based on new information, are subject to judicial review. 
(7) (a) If the board does not find a substantial issue, the board shall deny 
the hearing to the petitioner. 
(b) If the board finds a substantial issue, the board shall conduct a 
hearing in which the petitioner and the state may present evidence and 
argument as may be provided by board rules. 
History: C. 1953, 77-27-5.5, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 140, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 34. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Retroactive application. mmish the opportunity for commutation that 
. was available at the time the crime was com-
-Constitutionahty.
 n u t t e d m v l o l a t l o n o f U t a h C o n s t ^ j S e c 
For the Board of Pardons to apply the sub-
 1Q .u,i„4.,«„«_««„* r„„±^ i„.„„ A J 
, ,
 c , *** , ,_. - 18, prohibiting ex post tacto laws Andrews v 
stantive standards m Subsections (6) and (7) of 
this section in deciding whether to grant a 
petition for a commutation hearing would di-
Utah Bd of Pardons, 836 P2d 790 (Utah 1992) 
77-27-6. Payment of restitution. 
(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the release on parole of an 
inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to Section 
76-3-201 or whom the board has ordered to make restitution, and all or a 
portion of restitution is still owing, the board may establish a schedule, 
including both complete and court-ordered restitution, by which payment of 
the restitution shall be made, or order compensatory or other service in lieu of 
or in combination with restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervising the 
paroled offender's performance, the board may consider the factors specified in 
Subsection 76-3-201(4). 
(2) The board may impose any court order for restitution and order that a 
defendant make restitution in an amount not to exceed the pecuniary damages 
to the victim of the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, the 
victim of any other criminal conduct admitted to by the defendant to the 
sentencing court, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea agreement, unless the board applying the criteria 
as set forth in Subsection 76-3-201(4) determines that restitution is inappro-
priate. 
(3) The board may also make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all 
costs incurred by the Department of Corrections or the state or any other 
agency arising out of the defendant's needs or conduct. 
(4) If the defendant, upon termination of the parole period owes outstanding 
fines, restitution, or other assessed costs, the matter shall be referred to the 
district court for civil collection remedies. The Board of Pardons and Parole 
shall forward a restitution order to the sentencing court to be entered on the 
judgment docket. The entry shall constitute a lien and is subject to the same 
rules as a judgment for money in a civil judgment. 
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